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Note: Multiple Prosecution and Punishment of Unitary
Criminal Conduct-Minn. Stat. § 609.035
As part of the criminal code revision of 1963, the Minne-
sota legislature enacted Section 609.035 of the Minnesota Stat-
utes, which states:
Except as provided in section 609.585,1 if a person's conduct
constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state
he may be punished for only one of such offenses and a con-
viction or acquittal of any one of them is a bar to prosecution
for any other of them. All such offenses may be included in
one prosecution which shall be stated in separate counts.
This statute constitutes an attempt to correct a long standing de-
ficiency in the criminal law with respect to multiple prosecution
and punishment of unitary criminal conduct. However, an ex-
amination of the problem and its treatment historically by the
courts and legislatures, and the terms of the present Act and its
interpretation by the courts indicates that the statute has not
adequately corrected the deficiency and that therefore a new
statutory solution is desirable.
I. THE MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT, MULTIPLE
PROSECUTION PROBLEM
Because, in the strict sense, a criminal defendant is prose-
cuted and punished not for his past reprehensible conduct, but
for a definite offense abstracted from the incriminating histori-
cal incident,2 it is possible that a single criminal incident will
give rise to more than one offense. Two factors have signifi-
cantly increased the likelihood of this possibility. First, there
has been a proliferation of the number of specialized offenses
drawing on only limited aspects of an individual's behavior.
Second, the enactment of criminal legislation often proceeds
piecemeal; the legislature seemingly has been unaware of a par-
ticular statute's relation to offenses proscribing similar conduct."
Within this act-offense dichotomy is the potential for two
1. MrNN. STAT. § 609.585 (1969) provides: "A prosecution for or
conviction of burglary is not a bar to conviction of any other crime com-
mitted on entering or while in the building entered." The validity
of this exception to the principal statute is considered infra at note 82.
2. See Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense and Double Jeopardy,
58 YALE L.J. 513, 528 (1949).
3. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 n.10 (1970).
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distinct evils, each violative of separate policy objectives. First,
by punishing each offense the culpability of the defendant's be-
havior may be exaggerated.4  The underlying notion is that
where different offenses proscribe essentially the same conduct,
the legislative intent in enacting the statutes was to allow the
prosecutor greater latitude, given the exigencies of proof, rather
than to punish different aspects of the same behavior." Sec-
ond, when the offenses are separately prosecuted, a defendant
encounters the inconvenience of multiple trials in addition to
the dangers of multiple punishment,6 while the state wastes ju-
dicial resources, risks inconsistent verdicts7 and encourages in-
exact prosecution.8 Both evils may not be present in the same
case. When a prosecution follows a prior acquittal, issues of mul-
tiple punishment do not arise. On the other hand, if under mod-
ern procedural forms several offenses are joined in one prosecu-
tion, issues of multiple prosecution are absent.0
II. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The situations in which these dangers have been realized
have been determined in large part by the development of dou-
ble jeopardy doctrine.' 0 Prior to 1700 the plea of double jeo-
pardy1 ' protected criminal defendants from the dangers of both
multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments. At that time
the number of criminal offenses was small and each offense en-
compassed a broad range of behavior.'2  As a result there was
4. Advisory Committee Comment, 40 ,nfN. STAT. ANN. 58 (1964).
5. Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HAnv. L. REv. 818,
876 (1952).
6. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
7. This risk is diminished somewhat by the importation into the
criminal law of collateral estoppel. See note 24 infra and accompany-
ing text.
8. Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39
IOWA L. PEV. 317, 345 (1954).
9. State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 394, 398, 141 N.W.2d 519, 521 (1966).
10. See generally, AL FRIEDLAND, DouBLE JEOPARDY 3-16, 89-215
(1969); J. SiLmE, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 1-37 (1969).
11. The substance of this doctrine has not always been labeled
"double jeopardy." At an earlier date, the doctrine was clothed in the
maxims nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa, and nemo debet
bias puniri" pro uno delicto. K. FRImLAND, supra note 10, at 17. Coke
identified three pleas: auterfois acquitt, auterfois concivt, and former
pardon. COKE, THE THRDm PART OF THE INsTrTUTrS OF THE LAws OF
ENGLAND 212-213 (4th ed. 1669).
12. ML FREEDLAND, supra note 10, at 14; Comment, Statutory Imple-
mentation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a Moribund Con-
stitutional Guarantee, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 342 n.15 (1956).
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usually only one offense with which a defendant could be
charged for a given criminal episode. When at a subsequent
prosecution a plea of double jeopardy was interposed, the prior
and subsequent indictments were compared, and if both con-
cerned the same factual transaction the plea was sustained. 13
Eighteenth century developments narrowing the scope of
criminal prosecutions are primarily responsible for contemporary
multiple offense situations. Rigid pleading and proof require-
ments, and a rule prohibiting state appeal often resulted in
acquittals unsupported by the merits. 1 4 Moreover, an increase in
the number of offenses into which a defendant's conduct could
be parceled, 15 coupled with a rule prohibiting trials for more than
one offense at a time,16 prevented a defendant's total criminal be-
havior from being considered in any one prosecution. This limi-
tation on the factual content of a restricted procedure en-
abled prosecutors to avoid the impact of unwarranted acquit-
tals. Following an acquittal a defendant's residual conduct was
drawn upon to frame a new indictment charging a different
offense.1 7 By 1800, judicial acceptance of this technique was as-
sured when the judiciary reinterpreted double jeopardy to pro-
hibit reprosecution only if the same evidence was required to
prove the offenses charged.' 8 Employing the "same evidence"
test, a subsequent prosecution would not be barred so long as
each offense required proof of a fact which the other did not. 19
The "same evidence" test flourished in Minnesota. Typical
13. However, the plea was seldom used because the high inci-
dence of convictions and the severity of sentences left the state little
incentive to reprosecute. Comment, supra note 12, at 342.
14. Kirchheimer, supra note 2, at 529; Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis
Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HAnv. L. REv. 1, 9
(1960).
15. Comment, supra note 12, at 343.
16. M. FRIEDLAND, supra note 10, at 170-83.
17. Kirchheimer, supra note 2.
18. See The King v. Vandercomb & Abbot, 2 Leach 708, 168 Eng.
Rep. 455 (Ex. 1796). It was at approximately this time that double
jeopardy was elevated to a constitutional protection by U.S. CONST.
amend. V. Aside from the obvious advantages of this development, it
had the disadvantageous effect of crystalizing the doctrine at its 18th
century dimensions. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 215
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
19. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). This
is but one of many formulations of the "same evidence" test. See
generally M. FREDLAND, supra note 10, at 97-101. For purposes of this
discussion the significant fact is that all formulations of the test em-




is State v. Thompson,20 in which the conviction of the defend-
ant, a former county treasurer, for appropriating public money
to his own use was upheld despite a previous acquittal for re-
ceiving and refusing to pay the same money to his successor.
That each offense was predicated on the identical factual trans-
action did not interest the court. Instead, their attention was
focused on the requisite elements of the separate offenses and
the evidentiary inferences necessary to prove these elements. The
effect of the "same evidence" test was therefore to subordi-
nate the considerations involved in multiple prosecution of de-
fendants to the interest of the state in punishing violations of
the criminal law.
Two principal approaches ameliorate the harshness of the
"same evidence" test. First, the necessarily-included offense doc-
trine bars prosecution for an offense the commission of which
is included in the commission of an offense charged in a previ-
ous prosecution. 21 For example, a charge of rape necessarily
includes a charge of assault. This definition of included of-
fenses has been expanded by legislative enactments, now
consolidated in Section 609.04,22 to comprehend not only crimes
necessarily proved if the crime charged were proved, but also
a lesser degree of the same crime, an attempt to commit the
crime charged and an attempt to commit a lesser degree of the
same crime. However, even as expanded, this definition offers
defendants no more protection than the "same evidence" test
since the evidence required to prove any inclusive offense would
necessarily prove its included offenses. The significance of
Section 609.04 is in its procedural aspects. By providing that
"upon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be convicted of ei-
ther the crime charged or an included crime, but not both," the
20. 241 Minn. 59, 63, 62 N.W.2d 512, 517 (1954).
[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation
of two distinct statutory provisions, the test whether they are
two separate offenses or only one is whether one of the statu-
tory provisions requires an additional essential fact which the
other does not.
21. Kellett v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 2d 822, 825 n.2, 409 P.2d 206,
208, 48 Cal. Rptr. 366, 368 (1966).
22. Subdivision 1. Upon prosecution for a crime the actor may
be convicted of either the crime charged or an included crime,
but not both. An included crime may be any of the following:(1) a lesser degree of the same crime or(2) an attempt to commit the crime charged; or(3) an attempt to commit a lesser degree of the same
crime; or(4) a crime necessarily proved if the crime charged were
proved.
Subd. 2. A conviction or acquittal of a crime is a bar to
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statute de facto joins in one prosecution all offenses included
in the offense charged and eliminates the possibility of multiply
punishing the several offenses. Furthermore, since upon prose-
cution for an inclusive offense the defendant is put in jeopardy
for included offenses, reprosecution for an offense included in
an offense previously charged is foreclosed because the subse-
quent prosecution would place the defendant twice in jeopardy
for the included offense. Conversely, prosecution for an inclu-
sive offense is barred by an antecedent prosecution for an in-
cluded offense, since upon prosecution for the inclusive offense
the defendant would again be in jeopardy for the included of-
fense. The former half of this principal is codified in Subdivi-
sion 2, of Section 609.04; its converse has been supplied by ju-
dicial embellishment of the necessarily-included offense doc-
trine.2 3 Thus when the several offenses are included offenses,
what is in effect compulsory joinder of charges eliminates the
dangers of multiple punishments and prosecutions, and at the
same time allows the prosecutor access to the entirety of the de-
fendant's criminal behavior.
Second, the application of the "same evidence" test has been
narrowed by two aspects of res judicata: collateral estoppel
and the rule against unreasonably splitting a cause of action. In
the criminal law, collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of is-
sues previously litigated in favor of defendants. 24 However, its
effectiveness is limited by the difficulty of determining what
issues have actually been litigated in a previous prosecution
since most criminal verdicts are general.
Some states, either by judicial decision or legislative enact-
ment, have applied to their criminal law the rule against unrea-
sonably splitting a cause of action.25  In these states prosecu-
tion of an offense is barred if in a previous prosecution the de-
fendant was charged with an offense grounded in the same fac-
tual transaction.26 As stated, this "same transaction" test would
eliminate the danger of multiple prosecutions. However, because
its development proceeded apart from an effort to give the state a
further prosecution of an included crime, or other degree of
the same crime.
23. State v. Wondra, 114 Minn. 457, 131 N.W. 496 (1911); State v.
Wiles, 26 Minn. 381, 4 N.W. 615 (1880).
24. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970); United States v.
Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 87 (1916); State v. Robinson, 262 Minn. 79,
80, 114 N.W.2d 737, 740 (1962).
25. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West 1970); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 1938 (McKinney 1967).
26. Comment, supra note 12, at 348-49.
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full and fair opportunity to present its case, the courts in apply-
ing the test have expanded or contracted the notion of the
transaction to produce a result in keeping with their view of the
merits of the case. Oftentimes this has resulted in identifying
a separate transaction for each offense committed.27 The re-
sult in such cases has been precisely what would have obtained
under the "same evidence" test.
Minnesota is among those states which sanctioned legisla-
tively the "same transaction" test. Now repealed, Minnesota
Statute, Section 610.21 stated:
Any act or omission declared criminal and punishable in dif-
ferent ways by different provisions of law shall be punished
under only one such provision, and a conviction or acquittal
under any one shall bar a prosecution for the same act or omis-
sion under any other provision.
For the most part opinions written while the statute was cur-
rent fail to mention it. In one case, State v. Thompson2 8 the
court did discuss the statute but concluded:
This statute implements the constitutional provision against
double jeopardy but adds nothing to the scope of the prohibi-
tion contained therein. It is apparent that, in using the words
act or omission the legislature was using them in the restricted
and consequential sense of a single and separate offense.20
Such language merely restates the "same evidence" test.
III. THE TERMS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF
MINN. STAT. § 609.035
The inadequacy of Section 610.21, as is manifest by deci-
sions such as State v. Thompson, was directly responsible for
the enactment of Section 609.035.30 To implement its primary
purpose of eliminating the dangers of multiple prosecutions
and punishments, while at the same time permitting the state
to adequately punish violations of the criminal law,3 ' this
statute alters the approach of its predecessor in two significant
ways. First, the applicable unit behavior has been changed
from an "act or omission" to "a person's conduct." It follows
that any test for applying the statute was clearly intended "to
27. Id.
28. 241 Minn. 59, 62 N.W.2d 512 (1954).
29. Id. at 66, 62 N.W.2d at 518.
30. Advisory Committee Comment, 40 lMDN. STAT. ANN. 57-58
(1964).




emphasize the [underlying factual transaction] rather than the
offenses committed. 32
More significantly, the statute contemplates a method of
prosecuting the multiple offender by which his total criminal be-
havior is considered in one proceeding, with punishment being
limited to a single sentence of up to the maximum permitted
for the most serious crime for which there is a conviction. 8
This is to be accomplished by broad joinder of factually related
offenses, which are to be charged as separate counts in a single
indictment.3 4 Such joinder is compulsory in the sense that prose-
cution for offenses not joined in the original indictment is barred.
However, as a device for effecting such a method the stat-
ute is defective in two respects. First, by making the applica-
tion of both the protection against multiple punishments and
prosecutions turn on the same test, i.e., whether the "person's
conduct constitutes more than one offense,"' 8 that statute has
failed to separate the analysis of two protections which are based
on different policy considerations. As noted above,30 the rule
against multiple prosecutions protects defendants from harrass-
ment and saves the state time and money.87 The protection from
multiple punishments is designed to insure that punishment will
be commensurate with culpability.8 Thus conduct which is
divisible for purposes of punishment is often unitary for pur-
poses of prosecution.89 For example, "[a] defendant who blows
32. Id. at 400, 141 N.W.2d at 522.
33. Id.; Advisory Committee Comment, supra note 30, at 59.
34. State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 394, 406, 141 N.W.2d 519, 526 (1966).
35. .mN. STAT. § 609.035 (1969).
36. See notes 4-8 supra and accompanying text.
37. Kellett v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 2d 822, 825, 409 P.2d 206,
209, 48 Cal. Rptr. 366, 369 (1966).
38. Id.
39. A good deal of confusion surrounds the relationship between
these protections. While the application of each must be determined
with reference to a defendant's conduct, the point of reference with
respect to each is a different aspect of that conduct. There are at least
two senses in which we can use the notion of conduct in this context.
First, conduct may be thought of as episodic, i.e., an identifiable instance
of behavior the constituent parts of which are clustered about some
unifying element. The aspect of a defendant's behavior which cor-
responds to this sense is legally significant with respect to multiple
prosecutions. The question of the number of prosecutions to which a
defendant should be subjected is basically the procedural question of
the optimum scope of the criminal prosecution. A major thrust of
modern procedure, both civil and criminal, is that the scope of the pro-
ceeding should be determined with reference to the operative facts, and
not the substantive theories of civil or criminal liability. Furthermore,
it is usually agreed that all issues generated by a set of unified facts
[Vol. 56:646
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up an airplane killing all on board ... is properly subject to
greater punishment than a defendant who kills or harms only a
single person. However, it does not follow that such a defend-
ant should be liable to successive prosecutions."4 0  By creat-
ing an equivalency between the dimensions of conduct neces-
sary to activate both protections, the statute has obfuscated this
distinction, with the result that no suspect can be punished for
more than one offense if those offenses must be joined under
Section 609.035, even though---as in the airplane hypothetical-
multiple punishments resulting from a single prosecution would
frequently be desirable.4 1
The statute also fails to deal adequately with the problems
generated when the several offenses resulting from an instance
of indivisible conduct are within the prosecutive responsibility
of different authorities. In Minnesota this problem may arise
(1) if the actor violates a municipal ordinance and a state stat-
ute,42 or (2) if the offenses, though transgressions against the
(whether that unity is supplied by a transaction, intent, objective,
plan, or other factor about which the facts can be grouped) should be
determined in a single proceeding. Thus the rational way to determine
the divisibility of a defendant's behavior for purposes of prosecution is
to focus on its episodic qualities, disregarding the offenses to which it
gives rise. A minor qualification to this is that there is a point of inter-
section between the offenses charged and the permissible number of
prosecutions defined by severance from prejudicial joinder. See notes
76-77 infra and accompanying text.
Second, conduct may be thought of in the abstract and consequen-
tial sense of an offense, e.g., larceny, assault, rape, etc. The aspect of a
defendant's conduct which corresponds to this sense is legally signifi-
cant with respect to multiple punishments. Every offense has a cor-
responding punishment keyed to the social blameworthiness of the pro-
scribed behavior. The issue when several offenses are present is
whether that fact is indicative of compound culpability, or whether the
several offenses are merely different formulations of the same quan-
tum of blameworthiness. This determination should be made by focus-
ing on the offenses charged and the social interest they seek to protect.
See notes 85-89 infra and accompanying text.
40. Kellett v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 2d 822, 825, 409 P.2d 206,
209, 48 Cal. Rptr. 366, 369 (1966).
41. See note 93 infra.
42. The statute addresses itself to this situation. The advisory
committee comment accompanying the statute indicates that "'Of-
fense' is used in the section in the sense of a crime as defined in
§ 609.02, subd. 1. Hence, municipal ordinance violations are not in-
cluded." Advisory Committee Comment, 40 Mum. STAT. ANN. 58 (1964).
In two cases, State v. Clark, 189 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1971), and City of
Bloomington v. Kossow, 269 Minn. 467, 131 N.W.2d 206 (1964), this
aspect of the statute was invoked to permit prosecution and punish-
ment on both the municipal and state level. This is an unsatisfac-
tory approach, based, at least in part, on a rule of law which no
longer obtains. When the statute was enacted it was the law that
19721
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same sovereign, are prosecuted by different offices in different
courts. In turn each of these possibilities might arise in two
ways. The offenses might be within the subject matter juris-
diction of different courts,43 or might have been committed
within different territorial jurisdictions."4  This problem is par-
the federal constitution's prohibition of a double jeopardy did not
prohibit municipal and state governments from prosecuting and pun-
ishing the same offense. State v. Cavett, 171 Minn. 505, 214 N.W. 479
(1927); State v. Holm, 139 Minn. 267, 166 N.W. 181 (1918); State v.
Lee, 29 Minn. 445, 13 N.W. 913 (1882); cf. State v. Oleson, 26 Minn. 507,
5 N.W. 959 (1880). The rule was based on an analogy to the rule of
concurrent or dual sovereignties, which permits punishment by both
the state and federal governments when an act is an offense against
each. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois,
359 U.S. 121 (1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
Since that time the United States Supreme Court, in Waller v. Florida,
398 U.S. 387 (1970), has abrogated the distinction between a state and
its political subdivisions for purposes of reprosecution of the same
offense, holding such reprosecution unlawful. Therefore, since MNN.
STAT. § 609.035 (1969) is a legislative declaration that the considerations
which prohibit multiple prosecution of the same offense also pro-
hibit multiple prosecutions based on the same factual transaction, equal
protection of the law requires that municipal ordinance violators be
afforded the same protection as state statute violators.
Traffic ordinances have been held to be within the statute's opera-
tions, State v. Gladden, 274 Minn. 534, 144 N.W.2d 779 (1966), because
MfNN. STAT. § 169.03 (1969) stipulates that the provisions of the Highway
Traffic Regulation Act, MTNN. STAT. ch. 169 (1969), "shall be applicable
and uniform throughout this state and in all political subdivisions and
municipalities therein." This provision has been held to require a
municipality to afford a defendant the same protections as he would
be afforded by the state where the violations charged are also cov-
ered in Chapter 169. State v. Hoeben, 256 Minn. 436, 98 N.W.2d 816
(1959).
43. MINN. STAT. § 609.045 (1969) abrogates that portion of the dual
sovereignty doctrine that would permit Minnesota to prosecute a de-
fendant following a federal prosecution, by providing:
If an act or omission constitutes a crime under both the
laws of this state and the laws of another jurisdiction, a con-
viction or acquittal of such crime in the other jurisdiction bars
prosecution for the crime in this state.
It might be argued that "laws of another jurisdiction" includes mu-
nicipal ordinances. However, the Advisory Committee Comment ac-
companying the statute makes it clear that this language is intended
to reach only prosecutions in another country or state, or on the federal
level. 40 MNwN. STAT. ANN. 69 (1964). State v. Kooiman, 289 Minn.
439, 185 N.W.2d 534 (1971); City of Bloomington v. Kossow, 269 Minn.
467, 131 N.W.2d 206 (1964); State v. Wondra, 114 Minn. 457, 131 N.W.
496 (1911); State v. Wiles, 26 Minn. 381, 4 N.W. 615 (1880).
44. State v. Boucher, 286 Minn. 475, 176 N.W.2d 624 (1970); Opp.
MN. ATr'Y GEN., 989 a-8, Nov. 4, 1966. Or a defendant might commit
a robbery in one county and travel to another county where he is ar-
rested and charged with possession of stolen property, and subse-
quently be charged with robbery in the county where that crime took
place. In such a case the Minnesota constitutional (MUMN. CoNsT.
[Vol. 56:646
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ticularly acute where one of the offenses is a misdemeanor and
the other a felony.4 5 In such a case there is risk that those in
charge of prosecuting the minor offense will be unaware, or will
choose to ignore the fact that a defendant is chargeable with a
felony or risk that a well-advised defendant will plead guilty to
the minor offense to bar prosecution for the more serious
charge.46 The difficulties of requiring coordination between the
state's different levels of prosecutive authority suggests that
the inconvenience of a second prosecution is outweighed by
the possibility that a defendant guilty of a felony will escape
proper punishment.47  Nevertheless, symmetry, efficiency and
art. 1, § 6) and statutory (Mnm. STAT. § 627.01 (1969) ) venue pro-
visions prohibit joinder of offenses and permit the state to maintain
successive prosecutions. State v. Fleck, 281 Minn. 247, 156 N.W.2d 78
(1968).
45. In hinnesota the basic scheme of criminal ju-isdiction is allo-
cation of misdemeanors and ordinance violations to justice and mu-
nicipal courts (MNN. STAT. § 633.02, 488.04(5) (a) (1) (1969)) and fel-
onies to district courts, although lesser offenses are also cognizable
therein (Mii=. STAT. § 484.01 (1969)). Municipal courts may also
conduct preliminary hearings. MINN. STAT. § 488.04(5) (2) (b) (1969).
46. A similar problem arose in State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 394,
141 N.W.2d 519 (1966). In that case the defendant was charged at
one trial with driving while under the influence of alcohol and driving
over the center line. He maneuvered the court into disposing of the
driving over the center line charge before the driving while under the
influence charge, and then set up the statute as a bar to prosecution for
driving while under the influence. The court held that by this ma-
neuver the defendant had waived the protection from multiple prose-
cution. However, the protection from multiple punishment could not
be waived (a fact which indicates the procedural nature of the prosecu-
tion protection as opposed to the substantive nature of the punish-
ment protection) so that if convicted upon subsequent prosecution for
driving while under the influence he could only be punished for one of
the offenses. Id. at 404, 273 N.W.2d at 525; accord, State v. Gladden,
274 Minn. 533, 144 N.W.2d 779 (1966); cf. State v. Simpson, 28 Minn. 66,
9 N.W. 78 (1881).
While the waiver rule might be applied to the situation postulated
in the text, that situation lacks the essential element of a waiver. In
Johnson it was on the defendant's initiative that prosecution of the
offenses was separated. Where jurisdictional lines separate the prosecu-
tions in the first instance, the initiative upon which the waiver in
Johnson was predicated is absent. It would be unfair to penalize a
defendant for taking advantage of the situation as he finds it, since a
similarly situated defendant who by happenstance is prosecuted for the
lesser charge prior to the more serious one could not be held to have
waived the statute's protection.
47. To permit an accused to escape prosecution and punish-
ment for the serious offense by the happenstance of a pro-
cedural oversight which results in a prior conviction of a minor
offense perverts the policy and objectives of the statute by
foreclosing consideration of the total criminal behavior.
State v. Reiland, 274 Minn. 121, 125, 142 N.W.2d 635, 638 (1966).
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probable economy would result from requiring a coordinated as-
sessment of a defendant's conduct and the offenses to which it
gives rise. Furthermore, since the act-offense dichotomy is at
least within the penumbra of the federal constitution's interdic-
tion of double jeopardy,48 Mr. Justice Black's observation that
"the state with all its resources and power would not be allowed
to make repeated attempts to convict an individual . . . thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and com-
pelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and inse-
curity," is to some extent applicable.4 9
The statute's failure to separate considerations of multiple
punishments and multiple prosecutions, and its failure to deal
adequately with jurisdictional barriers to joinder has resulted in
a body of case law applying the staute which, though recon-
cilable in terms of policy, is analytically confusing. The court
has considered-to the neglect of multiple prosecution issues-
that the primary policy underlying the statute is to ensure
punishment that is commensurate with the criminality of the de-
fendant's behavior.50 Thus additional punishment, 51 or a subse-
quent prosecution anticipating such punishment, 52 has been per-
mitted when it is necessary to achieve parity between the de-
fendant's culpability and the punishment imposed. For exam-
ple, prosecution for a misdemeanor will not foreclose a subse-
The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code avoids this prob-
lem by requiring, inter alia, that offenses be joined only when they are
"within the jurisdiction of a single court." ALI MODEL PENAL CODE§ 1.08 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
In Minnesota's Hennepin and Ramsey counties it is the practice to
deal with this situation by staying prosecution of the misdemeanor on
the municipal level, pending prosectuion of a criminal negligence
charge by the county attorney's office. If the county attorney decides
not to prosecute the felony, municipal authorities are then free to resume
prosecution of the misdemeanor. Interview with assistant Henne-
pin County Attorney Tom Bambury, April 7, 1972; interview with
assistant Ramsey County Attorney Suzanne Flinsch, April 3, 1972.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Mr. Justice Brennan maintains that compulsory joinder of related
criminal charges is a constitutional imperative. Ashe v. Swenson, 397
U.S. 436, 453 (1970) (separate opinion); Abbate v. United States, 359
U.S. 187, 200 (1959) (concurring opinion).
49. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
50. State v. Reiland, 274 Minn. 121, 125, 142 N.W.2d 635, 638 (1966);
State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 394, 399, 141 N.W.2d 519, 522 (1966).
51. State v. Shevchuk, 282 Minn. 182, 163 N.W.2d 772 (1968); State
ex rel. Stangvik v. Tahash, 281 Minn. 353, 161 N.W.2d 667 (1968).
52. State v. Kooiman, 289 Minn. 439, 185 N.W.2d 534 (1971);
State v. Murphy, 277 Minn. 355, 152 N.W.2d 507 (1967); State v. Rie-
land, 274 Minn. 121, 142 N.W.2d 635 (1966).
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quent prosecution for a felony; 3 if the crime has several vic-
tms multiple punishment may be imposed; 4 and when both of-
fenses are misdemeanors, punishment can be imposed for only
one of the offenses and a conviction or acquittal of one will
bar prosecution for the other.5
The analytic technique used to justify these results when
the crimes are unintentional is best illustrated by a series of cases
in which the operation of an automobile resulted in two or
more traffic, or traffic-related, offenses.50 In each the issue was
whether the defendant's conduct constituted a single behavioral
incident, thereby activating the protections of the statute. The
seminal case applying the statute, State v. Johnson,5 7 articu-
lated the test by which this determination is to be made:
[I]t would seem that violations of two or more traffic statutes
result from a single behavioral incident where they occur at sub-
stantially the same time and place and rise out of a continuous
and uninterrupted course of conduct, manifesting an indivisible
state of mind or coincident errors of judgment. Under these
circumstances, there exists a substantial relationship between
the conduct constituting the violations 5s and the statute prohib-
53. See cases cited in note 52 supra. "Neither would conviction
of petitioner ... result in punishment disproportionate to the culpa-
bility of defendant . . " State v. Kooiman, 289 Minn. 439, 443, 185
N.W.2d 534, 537 (1971).
54. State ex rel. Stangvik v. Tahash, 281 Minn. 353, 161 N.W.2d 667
(1968). Compare State v. Shevchuk, 282 Minn 182, 188, 163 N.W.2d
772, 776 (1968) ("We think, moreover, that the punishment was not dis-
proportionate to the culpability of defendants in the aggregate of their
crime."); State v. Fredlund, 200 Minn. 44, 273 N.W. 353 (1937).
55. State v. Corning, 289 Minn. 382, 184 N.W.2d 603 (1971); State v.
Boucher, 286 Minn. 475, 176 N.W.2d 624 (1970); State v. Gladden, 274
Minn. 533, 144 N.W.2d 779 (1966); State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 394, 141
N.W.2d 519 (1966).
56. State v. Coming, 289 Minn. 382, 184 N.W.2d 603 (1971); State v.
Kooiman, 289 Minn. 439, 185 N.W.2d 534 (1971); State v. Boucher,
286 Minn. 475, 176 N.W.2d 624 (1970); State v. Gladden, 274 Minn.
533, 144 N.W.2d 779 (1966); State v. Reiland, 274 Minn. 121, 142 N.W.2d
635 (1966); State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 394, 141 N.W.2d 519 (1966).
57. 241 Minn. 59, 62 N.W.2d 512 (1954).
58. In terms of the conduct constituting each offense there are at
least five generic relationships between offenses. The following are
paradigmatic:
A. Possession of narcotics and reckless driving,
B. Unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and reckless driving,
C. Driving after revocation of one's driver's license and reck-
less driving,
D. Driving while under the influence of alcohol and reckless
driving,
E. Speeding and reckless driving.
To the extent that the relationship between the conduct constituting the
violations is determinative, E presents the strongest case since the
conduct used to establish each offense is identical, D also presents a
strong case: not only is the operation of an automobile an essential ele-
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its both double punishment and serialized prosecutions. 59
Confusion arises because the test has been applied in two dis-
tinct ways depending on the punishment requirements of the
case at bar. When the culpability of the defendant's conduct is
such that the court feels that the statute's protection should
be granted the court has focused on the physical quality 0 of
his behavior in applying the test, describing his action in such
a way that the singleness of the behavior is apparent. Typical
is State v. Johnson,61 in which the defendant was charged with
two misdemeanors-driving while under the influence of alco-
hol and driving over the center line. The court stated:
The defendant's infractions occurred during a continuous and
uninterrupted operation of his automobile, which took place
within a period of a few minutes and a distance of two blocks.
. .. While in the restricted sense there was more than one
"act," there can be little doubt that this was a "single be-
havioral incident." The defendant's goal was to drive his car
from one point to another, and in so doing, both his condition
and the manner in which he drove were traffic offenses.6 2
On the other hand, when the protection of the statute is to
be withheld, the court has compared the offenses charged, em-
ment of each offense, but there is a cause and effect relationship be-
tween intoxication and reckless driving. Other than the common ele-
ment of operation of an automobile, the only relationship between the
conduct constituting each offense in C is the fact that drivers' licenses
are usually revoked for offenses such as reckless driving. As to situa-
tions B and A the relationship is less strong, a fortiori from C.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the statute is opera-
tive in situations of type D. State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 394, 141 N.W.2d
519 (1966); State v. Gladden, 274 Minn. 533, 144 N.W.2d 779 (1966).
But it has refused to grant its protection to defendants in situations of
type C. State v. Reiland, 274 Minn. 121, 142 N.W.2d 635 (1966). There-
fore, it is fair to conclude that the relationship between the conduct
constituting each offense will be denominated "substantial" where ei-
ther the conduct used to establish each offense is the same, or the
offenses possess significantly common elements and are such that they
often occur together.
59. 273 Minn. at 404, 141 N.W.2d at 525.
60. See note 40 supra.
61. 273 Minn. 394, 141 N.W.2d 519 (1966).
62. Id. at 404, 141 N.W.2d at 525. Accord, State v. Boucher, 286
Minn. 475, 480, 176 N.W.2d 624, 627 (1970) ("It appears ... that he was
driving continuously during this time at high and excessive rates of
speed heedless of traffic control devices in a continuous intensive effort
to evade police .... [A]t no stage was there an interruption or sur-
cease in the reckless operation of the vehicle"); State v. Coming, 289
Minn. 382, 387, 185 N.W.2d 603, 607 (1971) ("[T]he most logical explana-
tion of the sequence of events and circumstances would seem to be that
the influence of alcohol was an important factor which could have
caused relator to leave the scene of the accident ... to confusedly circle
the block, and to exhibit signs of erratic driving behavior . ").
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phasizing their disparate elements in an analysis divorced from
the factual context out of which the offenses arose. For ex-
ample, in State v. Reiland,63 in which the tenability of a crim-
inal negligence prosecution (a felony) following conviction for
driving after revocation of one's driver's license (a misdemeanor)
was in issue, the court stated:
But even assuming that the offense of driving after revocation
occurred at the same time and place as his alleged negligent
driving, since the former offense by its nature is continuous...
and recognizing that negligent driving obviously requires driving
a vehicle, we hold that both violations, under the circumstances,
do not "manifest an indivisible state of mind or coincident
errors of judgment." There is no substantial relationship be-
tween the conduct constituting each offense. Since it is quite
possible, and perhaps very probable, for one to drive carefully
despite revocation of his driver's license, that misconduct-un-
like, for example, reckless driving-need have no relation-
ship to driving in a grossly negligent manner .... The conduct
constituting each offense is not the result of a single motiva-
tion directed toward a single goal but is essentially dissimi-
lar in both respects.6 4
For crimes in which intent is an essential element of the
offenses charged, the test for determining the singleness of the
behavorial incident is "whether the segment of conduct in-
volved was motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal
objective."65 This notion can be particularized so as to find a
"single criminal objective" for each offense charged. In State
ex rel. Stangvik v. Tahash,66 in which a defendant killed his wife
and two children in the course of a few minutes, the court up-
held sentences on one count of first degree murder and two
counts of second degree murder, stating:
[M]uch would depend on the harm inflicted and whether mul-
tiple sentences would result in punishment grossly out of pro-
portion to the gravity of the offense .... The fact that the
crimes occurred at substantially the same time and place ...
does not in itself require the application of the statute. These
were three separate murders intentionally inflicted on three
63. 274 Minn. 121, 142 N.W.2d 635 (1966).
64. Id. at 124, 142 N.W.2d at 638. Accord, State v. Kooiman, 289
Minn 439, 442, 185 N.W.2d 534, 536 (1971) ("[P]etitioner here was con-
victed of drunkenness, a continuous and intentional crime, and there-
after charged with the nonintentional crime of criminal negligence ....
Driving a vehicle is in no way necessary to the offense of drunken-
ness . . . ."); State v. Murphy, 277 Minn 355, 356, 152 N.W.2d 507, 509
(1967) ("in considering whether defendant's conduct constituted more
than one offense so as to make conviction or acquittal of one a bar to
prosecution of the other, the elements of both offenses with which
the defendant was charged should be considered").
65. State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 394, 404, 141 N.W.2d 519, 525 (1966).
66. 281 Minn. 353, 161 N.W.2d 667 (1968).
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separate victims. From a legal point of view they were totally
unrelated.67
This pattern-emphasizing the offense as opposed to the act
in order to impose additional punishment and emphasizing the
act rather than the offense when additional punishment is not
desired-demonstrates the continuity of legal doctrine and tech-
nique. The analytic precursor of the former approach is the
"same evidence" test. The latter approach antedates the eight-
eenth century when analytically the main signpost of double
jeopardy was the underlying factual transaction. 8
IV. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS TO THE MULTIPLE
PUNISHMENT, MULTIPLE PROSECUTION
PROBLEM
A preferable approach to the multiple offense problem en-
tails separate consideration of the prosecution and punishment
issues in a two-step analysis. First, the number of prosecutions
the state may bring should be determined by focusing on the
physical quality of the defendant's behavior. Second, the of-
fenses for which the defendant may be separately punished
should be determined by considering the substantive relation-
ship between them. 9
The need for a separate analysis of the prosecution could
be satisfied by importing into the criminal law that portion of
the civil doctrine of res judicata that requires joinder of factu-
ally related claims. 70 The notion is similar to that which has
gained widespread acceptance in the civil law, namely, that in-
convenience to defendants is minimized and public economy en-
couraged where all matters logically related to a coherent set of
operative facts are determined in a single proceeding.
The scope of conduct contemplated by a single prosecution
should differ quantitatively and qualitatively from that con-
templated by a single punishment. Proximity in time and space
will necessarily enter into considerations of trial convenience.
However, conduct which is spatially and temporally disparate
may still be sufficiently framed by the intent or objective of
67. Id. at 361, 161 N.W.2d at 673.
68. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
69. This step of the suggested approach is detailed at notes 82-94
and accompanying text.
70. See Schaefer, Unresolved Issues in the Law of Double Jeopardy:
Waller and Ashe, 58 CALIF. L. Ruv. 391, 398 (1970).
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the actor. One statutory formulation of these notions is Sec-
tion 1.08(2) of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code:
(a) the offenses are based on the same conduct; or (b) the
offenses are based on a series of acts or omissions motivated
by a purpose to accomplish a single criminal objective, and nec-
essary or incidental to the accomplishment of the objective;
or (c) the offenses are based on a series of acts or omissions
motivated by a common purpose or plan and which result in
the repeated commission of the same offense or affect the same
person or the same persons or the property thereof. 1
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also encourage joinder
of certain offenses.7 2 The cases and commentary applying and
interpreting this rule,7 3 as well as those applying and interpreting
the similar civil notion of "same transaction or occurance" could
profitably be studied.7 4
When several traffic charges result from a single instance
of the operation of an automobile, the defendant's conduct
should be within the scope of a single prosecution. For pur-
poses of efficient prosecution it is sufficient that the defendant
sought to drive from one place to another even though he com-
mitted several offenses in doing so. Typically the same evidence
will be admissible on each charge, and often a single law enforce-
ment officer will be the sole prosecution witness. While the op-
eration of an automobile necessarily involves points in space
71. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(2) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
See A.B.A., Mnmaxn STNDDAs FOR CRIMIAL JusTcE, JonDER Am
SEVmANcE, §§ 1.1, 1.3 (Approved Draft, 1968); IL. REv. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 3-3 (1963) (requiring joinder of all known offenses based on the
same act).
England now requires the prosecution to "bring forward their whole
case, and will not ... permit the same parties to open the same subject
of litigation in respect of a matter which might have been brought for-
ward as part of the subject in contest." Conelly v. Director of Public
Prosecutions [1964] A.C. 1254.
72. FED. R. Csnv. P., Rule 8 (a) reads:
Joinder of Offenses: Two or more offenses may be joined in
the same indictment or information in a separate count for
each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misde-
meanors or both, are of the same or similar character or are
based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts
or transactions connected together or constituting a common
scheme or plan.
73. See generally 1A W. BARON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE
AND PROCEDURE § 1931 (Wright ed. 1960) and cases cited therein; 8 J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE par. 8.05 (1968) and cases cited therein.
74. FED. R. Civ. P., Rule 13(a). See generally 1A W. BARRON &
A. HoLTzoFr, FEDERAL PRACTICE jam PROcEDURE § 394 (Wright ed. 1960)
and cases cited therein; 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 13.13 (1968)
and cases cited therein.
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and time which are removed from one another, these factors
do not, for purposes of prosecution, deserve the strained analy-
sis the court has given them.75
Admittedly, the outer limits of conduct for prosecution pur-
poses can not be precisely defined. However, when the prose-
cution issue is divorced from considerations of punishment, a
satisfactory result is more likely to be reached in an individual
case.
Accompanying any joinder provision should be a provision
for severance when joinder might prejudice the defendant. 70
Allowing limited severance is essential. As was stated in Drew
v. United States:77
The argument against joinder is that the defendant may be
prejudiced for one or more of the following reasons: (1) he
may become embarrassed or confounded in presenting separate
defenses; (2) the jury may use the evidence of one of the crimes
charged to infer a criminal disposition on the part of the de-
fendant from which is found his guilt of the other crime or
crime charged; or (3) the jury may cumulate the evidence
of the various crimes charged and find guilt when, if con-
sidered separately, it would not so find. A less tangible, but
perhaps equally persuasive, element of prejudice may reside
in a latent feeling of hostility engendered by the charging of
several crimes as distinct from only one. Thus, in any given
case the court must weigh prejudice to the defendant caused by
the joinder against the obviously important considerations of
economy and expedition in judicial administration.
While an approach which separates consideration of multi-
ple prosecution from multiple punishment would effectively
implement the multiple prosecution objectives of Section 609.035,
it may be necessary to make other innovations so that the bal-
ance of advantage does not shift to criminal defendants. As
previously stated, reprosecution for a technically different of-
fense was a response to rigid pleading and proof requirements,
and to limitations on state appeal.78  Civil experience with
joinder of causes of action and notice pleading would indicate
a need for liberal amendment of indictments. 79  State appeal
encounters substantial constitutional barriers derived princi-
pally from the constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy.8 0
75. See notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text.
76. E.g., FED. R. CRiM. P., Rule 14; ALl MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(3) (Tent. Draft no. 5, 1956). Rule 14 provides for severance where
either the defendant or state is prejudiced. However, it is difficult to
imagine a case in which joinder of offenses would prejudice the state.
77. 331 F.2d 85, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
78. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
79. See Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense, and Double Jeopardy,
58 YALE L.J. 513, 528 (1949).
80. See Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Suc-
cessive Prosecutions, 74 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1960).
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It has been argued that restructure of the double jeopardy pro-
tection insofar as it relates to the multiple offense problem
would permit revaluation of the limits on state appeal.8 ' How-
ever, a principal argument against multiple prosecutions based
on the same factual transaction is that they permit the state
to achieve indirectly what the prohibition of state appeal for-
bids it to do directly. Nothing has been gained if the cost of
protecting defendants from multiple prosecutions is to subject
them to the same evil in the guise of state appeal.
Punishment is prescribed for certain behavior, denominated
criminal, because society acting through the legislature has
deemed it violative of an interest worthy of legal protection. In
theory punishment should be commensurate with the invaded
interest's position on the social hierarchy. Therefore, where
more than one offense proscribes essentially the same conduct,
only those offenses which subserve distinct social interests may
be separately punished8s2  Viewed from this perspective, ques-
tions of multiple punishment become questions of multiple in-
terests and the relations and demarcations between them.83
Extensive analysis of the principals involved in a social in-
terest approach to multiple punishments is beyond the scope of
this note.8 4 However, in two types of factual situations, the ap-
proach is not difficult to apply.
The first is the case involving the commission of a felony and
a misdemeanor simultaneously, in which most persons committing
the greater crime also commit the lesser. For example, in State
v. Kooiman,8 5 the defendant was involved in an automobile
accident which resulted in the death of a pedestrian. The de-
fendant was charged with drunkenness and criminal negligence.
81. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904) (dis-
senting opinion of Holmes, J.); Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 80,
at 8-15.
82. This analysis suggests that where several offenses are com-
mitted during the course of a burglary, see note 1 supra, the several
offenses charged should be joined in a single prosecution even though
several punishments might be permissible.
83. This approach considers only the retributive objective of
punishment to the exclusion of punishment's rehabilitative objective.
Notwithstanding punishment's other objectives a separate social inter-
ests analysis is valid within the domain of retribution.
84. See generally Horack, The Multiple Consequences of a Single
Criminal Act, 21 M1Nn. L. RBv. 805, 819 (1937); Kirchheimer, supra
note 79.
85. 289 Minn. 439, 185 N.W.2d 534 (1971).
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It was eventually determined that he could be punished for both
offenses, not on the basis of a societal interests analysis, but
because a division of prosecutive authority resulted in the mis-
demeanor being reduced to judgment before the felony was
prosecuted.86 Hence, punishment for the criminal negligence
charge was also permitted lest the felon escape with only a
small fine. If the approach suggested herein is adopted, both
offenses would be tried in a single proceeding and only if both
resulted in conviction would the question of whether each could
be punished be reached. That question would be answered in
the negative. At first it appears that these offenses are con-
cerned with dissimilar objectives. The offense of drunkenness,
then codified in the intoxicating liquors chapter,8'7 promoted
public decorum; criminal negligence, enacted as part of the
criminal code, is designed to protect the physical integrity of
persons properly upon the highway.8 8  However, to charge the
operator of an automobile with drunkenness is to prefer a gen-
eral charge when a specific one is available-driving while un-
der the influence of alcohol. Viewed in their factual context
the two offenses do protect the same interest since it is the prin-
cipal objective of the criminal negligence statute to criminalize
the drunken driver who is responsible for a death. Thus
punishment up to the maximum allowed for the more serious
offense, i.e., criminal negligence, would adequately vindicate the
social interests invaded.89
86. See notes 44-49 supra and accompanying text.
87. Since the date of this case the crime of drunkenness has been
repealed in Minnesota.
88. State v. Reiland, 274 Minn. 121, 124, 142 N.W.2d 635, 638 (1966).
89. In many multiple traffic offense situations the identity or dis-
parity of the interests subserved by the several statutes is not so easily
determined. For example, in State v. Corning, 289 Minn. 382, 184 N.W.
2d 603 (1971), the defendant was charged with driving while under the
influence of alcohol and with leaving the scene of an accident without
leaving the required information. While both of these offenses are in-
cluded in the Highway Traffic Regulation Act (MINN. STAT. ch. 169
(1969) ) and are designed to promote highway safety, an analysis at
this level is not helpful. Punishment for driving while under the in-
fluence cannot adequately merge into punishment for leaving the scene
since the former offense carries a mandatory license revocation of at
least 30 days. Nor, since both offenses are misdemeanors, can the driv-
ing while under the influence violation encompass the leaving the scene
violation on the same order as the felony encompassed the misdemeanor
in Kooiman.
The information statute is designed to facilitate accident reporting
and claim settlement, while the driving while under the influence
statute is designed to prevent accidents in the first instance. If this is
the correct level of particularization from which to conduct the search
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In a case such as this there is also imbedded a distinction
between misdemeanors and felonies which, though subordinate
to considerations of the social interests involved, might oper-
ate as a presumption in disposing of cases in which the relation-
ship between the interests invaded is difficult to determine.0
Long prison terms and heavy fines are a benchmark of our crim-
inal law. Often when one or more of the offenses committed is
a felony the defendant can be adequately punished by sentencing
him for only the most grievous offense committed. Particu-
larly is this so when capital punishment or life imprisonment
may be imposed for the offense.91 Moreover, it is in the case
of a felony that punishment's rehabilitative objective is most
important so that any loss of parity between punishment and
culpability is tolerable. When the offenses are misdemeanors it
may be necessary to punish each, since misdemeanors carry light
fines and sentences. 92
On the other hand, a separate social interests approach to
the multiple punishment question would offer a more plausible
rationale for imposing multiple punishments when a defendant's
intentional crime has more than one victim. In State ex rel.
Stangvik v. Tahash,9 3 noted earlier, the defendant was punished
for each of three murders committed in the course of a few min-
utes. However, this result was predicated on the so-called legal
autonomy of each crime, rather than a recognition of the fact
that society's interest in protecting the life of each of its citi-
zens is invaded at the taking of each life. 4  Yet such a rule
for separate interests, both violations should be punished, since distinct
objectives are indicative of distinct interests. However, it seems un-
fair to allow the two offenses to reinforce one another, permitting
punishment to be imposed up to the maximum allowed for each of-
fense. This is particularly so when one offense is ancillary to the
other, as in this case, where, had the defendant not been intoxicated, he
might not have been involved in an accident, and once involved he
might not have left the scene. This is not to suggest that intoxication
exculpates leaving the scene of an accident, but neither does it aggravate
that offense since one who leaves the scene of an accident while intoxi-
cated has acted no more egregiously than one who does the same while
sober.
90. See note 89 supra.
91. See note 94 infra.
92. See note 89 supra. However, MNxN. STAT. § 609.15(2) (1969)
limits the total imprisonment for multiple conviction of misdemeanors
to one year.
93. 281 Minn.353, 161N.W.2d 667 (1968).
94. In such a case multiple punishments might be thought to be
superfluous since first degree murder has a mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment. However, the actual effect of multiple punishments
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is not sufficiently articulate to dispose of all multiple victim cases
since it glosses over a distinction between tort and criminal law.
The tortfeasor is required to recompense the injured individual,
or individuals, whereas the criminal is required to recom-
pense society. In the latter case a convict's burden should not be
multiplied if the number of his victims bears no rational rela-
tion to the culpability of his behavior. For example, an indi-
vidual whose culpably negligent driving results in an accident
which causes the death of several people should not be held ac-
countable for several counts of criminal negligence. Perhaps the
distinction to be taken is between those crimes where an in-
tent to invade the protected interests of several individuals can
be identified as opposed to those crimes where such a rigorous
intent is lacking.
V. CONCLUSION
Section 609.035 is a blunt, confusing legislative solution to a
complex problem of criminal justice administration. As future
cases call for its application, the court will exercise its sense of
justice by manipulating the "single behavioral incident" test and
noting "with emphasis that any decision . ..depends upon the
facts and circumstances of the case."9 5 Yet confusion remains
inevitable so long as the court is obliged to work with a stat-
ute that binds together issues of multiple prosecutions and is-
sues of multiple punishments. A scheme which would require
joinder of factually related charges"o with punishment imposed
according to the various social interests invaded would sepa-
rate these issues, adequately protect defendants and give the
state a full and fair opportunity to prosecute and punish viola-
tions of the criminal law.
in such a case is not penal overkill, but rather delay of eligibility for
parole. M/iNN. STAT. § 243.05 (1969).
95. State v. Kooiman, 289 Minn. 439, 441, 185 N.W.2d 534, 536
(1971).
96. See note 39 supra.
[Vol. 56:646
